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INNOVATIONS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF
HEALTH SERVICES:
INHIBITING vs. PERMISSIVE REGULATION
EDWARD H. FORGOTSON*
RUTH ROEMERj
ROGER W. NEWMANt
The National Commission on Community Health Services has recom-
mended as a national health goal that the American people have a civic
right to the best attainable personal health care at the least cost.' In order
to achieve this goal, the United States requires increases in both the num-
bers and productivity of medical service personnel. Since we cannot pro-
duce the quantity of doctors needed overnight, we must concentrate on
the most efficient use of the available manpower.2 The latter goal can
be furthered by changes in the organization of health services, such as in-
creased development and use of group practice, institutional practice,4
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Medicine.
f Associate Researcher and Lecturer, U.C.L.A. School of Medicine.
: Principal Attorney for the study "The Mentally Retarded and the Law" at the
Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Criminology of George Washington University.
1. THE NAT'L COMII'N ON COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES, HEALTH IS A C0n1s-
MUNITY AFFAiR, 17-37 (1966) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L Coasas'N REPORT].
2. See NAT'L COaMn'N REPORT 23, 24; see also REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S CoMMas.
ON Hosp. COSTS (1965); President's Message on Education and Health, 25 CONO. Q.
319-22 (1967).
3. "Group medical practice can be defined as the application of medical service by
a number of physicians working in systematic association with the joint use of equip-
ment, technical personnel and utilizing centralized administration and financial organi-
zation." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, DIGEST OF OFFICIAL AcTIONS 1846-1958, at 332
(1959). Later recommedations of the A.M.A. have suggested a minimum number of
three physicians to constitute group practice. The U.S. Public Health Service defines
group practice as a formal association of three or more physicians generally providing
services in more than one specialty with income being pooled and distributed according
to a prearranged plan. See HUNT & GOLDSTEIN, MEDICAL GROUP PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (P.H.S. Pub. No. 77, 1951).
There are no legal barriers to physicians' associations as such. Many group prac-
tices are simply partnerships, and the medical partnership has never been challenged
as an illegal form of medical practice.
4. Institutional practice can be defined as practice in which non-profit hospitals or
other institutions such as medical schools or clinics employ salaried physicians to render
a full array of personal health care to all patients served by the hospital or institution
on an in or out patient basis.
Washington University Open Scholarship
INNOVATIONS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF HEALTH SERVICES 401
and multi-disciplinary health care teams.5 These modem practices provide
more comprehensive and accessible patient service than do independent
practitioners because they more effectively utilize a wider variety of special
skills, paramedical assistance, and technical equipment. 6 The completely
independent practice of medicine seems no longer either scientifically or
economically feasible.7
The problem of the rising costs of health care, particularly hospital care,8
can be met through innovations in prepaid health care coverage. Com-
prehensive prepayment programs? will not only help to control rising costs
but may increase the productivity of health personnel. By combining pre-
ventive, diagnostic, therapeutic, and rehabilitative services, such programs
allow these services to be managed as a single health care system."
This article concerns the effect of current legal rules upon the possibility
of developing non-profit, consumer-sponsored, prepaid comprehensive
health-service programs. Concomitantly considered are the effects of exist-
ing law upon physician sponsored plans, such as Blue Shield, and upon
institutional practice under which non-profit hospitals or other institutions
employ salaried physicians. The legal areas covered include:
1. Rules prohibiting the corporate practice of medicine;
2. Enabling acts permitting the operation of prepaid health-service
plans;
3. Insurance codes and regulations protecting the public against fraudu-
lent or financially unstable prepayment plans; and
4. Restraint-of-trade rules protecting prepayment plans against harass-
ment and interference.
5. Multi-disciplinary health care teams can be defined as formally or informally or-
ganized groups consisting of physicians, professional nurses, practical nurses, medical
technologists, physical therapists, clinical psychologists and medical or psychiatric social
workers who have the coordinated responsibility for planning and delivering personal
health care to patients served by a hospital or institution rendering medical care.
6. CITIZENS' COMM'N ON GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION, THE GRADUATE EDU-
CATION OF PHYSICIANS 24-26 (1966). See also NAT'L COMM'N REPORT 24.
7. See CITIZENS' COMM'N ON GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION, supra note 6, at 24-25.
8. See generally REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON Hosp. Cosrs, supra note 2.
9. For a definition and explanation of prepaid health care coverage, see notes 44-53
infra, and accompanying text.
10. See NAT'L COMm'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 17-38. Prepaid programs may also
reduce hospital utilization and thereby reduce total costs of care by providing prepaid
coverage for out-patient and preventive services.
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I. THE RULE AGAINST THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
A. Rationale and Application
Rules prohibiting the corporate practice of medicine, which resulted
from judicial interpretations of medical and dental practice acts,1 cur-
rently exist in all states except Missouri12 and Nebraska."3 The following
is a typical statement of the rule and its rationale:
While a corporation is in some sense a person, and for many purposes
is so considered, yet, as regards the learned professions which can only
be practiced by persons who have received a license to do so after
an examination as to their knowledge of the subject, it is recognized
that a corporation cannot be licensed to practice such a profession. 4
This rule has been produced by mandatory professional licensure. Licen-
sure statutes specifically enumerate those individuals permitted to render
health services; because these do not include corporations, they are not
permitted to practice. As generally applied, the rule also prevents the
practice of medicine (or surgery or dentistry) by a corporation even through
licensed employees. The rule may not be applied, however, if the services
being performed by the corporation are performable by other than licensed
individuals."5
The rule prohibiting corporate practice is enforced primarily by the
courts, but opinions of attorneys general' and decisions of professional
disciplinary boards"7 contributed to its development. In recent years, ju-
11. See generally Willcox, Hospitals and the Corporate Practice of Medicine, 45
CORN. L. Q. 432 (1960); Hansen, Group Health Plans-A Twenty-Year Legal Review,
42 MINN. L. REV. 527 (1958).
12. See Sager v. Lewin, 128 Mo. App. 149, 106 S.W. 581 (1907) (a corporation
may contract with doctors of medicine to furnish medical care and may properly be
chartered for that purpose); 1962 Op. ATT'Y GEN. No. 8 (Mo.) (contracting with
licensed medical practitioners to furnish medical care does not constitute the practice
of medicine).
13. See Tarry v. Johnston, 114 Neb. 496, 208 N.W. 615 (1926) (making contracts
and collecting compensation therefore is not practicing medicine); State Electro-Med-
ical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103, N.W. 1078 (1905); State Electro-Medical
Institute v. Platner, 74 Neb. 23, 103 N.W. 1079 (1905).
14. Willcox, supra note 11, at 438.
15. See id. at 444-59.
16. See opinions cited notes 24-27, 39 infra; 1957 Op. A-r'y GEN. WW-278 (Tex.)
ruling that it is corporate practice and a violation of the licensing act for a corporation
to employ a licensed physician to treat patients and itself receive the fee.
17. See, e.g., State Bd. v. Savelle, 90 Colo. 177, 8 P.2d 693 (1932) (dentistry-
one of the "Painless Parker" cases); Taber v. State Bd., 137 N.J.L. 392, 60 A.2d 290
(1948) (dentist cannot be employed by unlicensed layman); Rockett v. Texas State
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 287 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1956) (violation of
medical licensing law for doctor to be employed by clinic owned by layman).
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dicial interpretations have been explicitly accepted by several legislatures
which have enacted statutory amendments embodying the rule. 8
The evil that this rule was intended to combat was the use of the cor-
porate form by unscientific or unethical practitioners in furtherance of
their commercial motives.19 It has modem relevance not only in preventing
quackery, deception, and commercial exploitation, but, more significantly,
in preventing lay interference with acts or decisions requiring professional
judgment and in preventing division of professional loyalty between pa-
tients' interests and those of the corporation.2" Unfortunately, the rule has
occasionally evolved into a categorical prohibition of all corporate prac-
tice, without any necessary relation to the evils it is designed to prevent.
Despite the rule's limited purposes, courts and attorneys general in a
majority of recent decisions have used a formalistic approach. Some courts
have found the corporate form not controlling if the corporation was non-
profit, operated for the mutual benefit of its members, and did not hold
itself out as practicing medicine. 2' Generally, however, decisions have
been based upon the mere existence of the corporate form rather than
upon how particular forms of organization actually affect the quality of
health services. Profit-making corporations, commercialized painless den-
tists, optometrists working in jewelry stores, and chiropractors are gener-
18. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-1-17(1) (n) (1963) (physician may
not practice as employee of corporation, association or partnership); GA. CODE ANN. §
84-916(18) (1957) (ground for license revocation for doctor to assist unlicensed as-
sociations or corporations); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 3751 (1964) (no person
or corporation may practice a healing art unless licensed); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
147.225(3) (b) (1959) (no employer-employee relationship permitted between hos-
pitals and physicians not permitted to receive salaries).
19. See, e.g., Silver v. Lansburgh & Bros., 27 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1939); Funk
Jewelry Co. v. State ex tel. La Prade, 46 Ariz. 348, 50 P.2d 945 (1935); State ex tel.
Att'y Gen. v. Gus Blass Co., 193 Ark. 1159, 105 S.W.2d 853 (1937); Parker v. Board
of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932); People v. Painless Parker Den-
tist, 85 Colo. 304, 275 P. 928 (1929); State Bd. of Examiners v. Friedmans' Jewelers,
Inc., 183 Ga. 669, 189 S.E. 238 (1936); Dvorine v. Castelberg Jewelry Corp., 170 Md.
661, 185 A. 562 (1936); Bartron v. Codington County, 68 S.D. 309, 2 N.W.2d 337
(1942). See generally Willcox, supra note 11.
20. See Willcox, supra note 11, at 444-45.
21. See, e.g., Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445, 446 (D.D.C. 1938).
The court made a distinction between a profit-oriented scheme such as the commercial
dentists and non-profit group health plans, which presented none of the social evils re-
quiring enforcement of the rule.
22. See generally LAW DEP'T OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N, A STUDY RE-
LATING TO THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE IN THE UNITED STATES. This
report provides numerous examples of the formalistic reasoning followed by courts and
attorneys general throughout the United States.
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ally lumped together with non-profit hospitals or service plans employing
physicians.2"
The California attorney general, for example, ruled that a non-profit
hospital corporation could not be permitted to contract with physicians
for the performance of professional services for fixed salaries because such
contracts would tend to debase the profession and jeopardize the public
health, safety, and welfare.24 The Colorado attorney general refused to
make any distinction between profit-making and non-profit corporations."
Perhaps the most extreme illustrations of this formalistic approach is pro-
vided by two opinions from Idaho attorneys general. One ruled that a
hospital employing radiologists, anesthesiologists and pathologists was in
violation of state law because of the hospital's potential control over them.2
A subsequent attorney general, while sustaining his predecessor's opinion,
offered to prepare a leasing agreement between a physician and a hospital
which would allow the hospital to collect the physician's fees, furnish all
of his facilities, provide for fair compensation to the physician and hospital,
and yet not involve potential control of the physician by the hospital.27
This opinion solved the control problem simply by labeling physicians
as tenants, rather than as employees. It did not examine the actual op-
portunities for control in either situation. If it is possible to draw a lease-
hold contract which avoids potential lay control of a professional tenant,
it should also be possible to preclude such potential through specific terms
of an employment contract.
B. Comparison with the Practice of Law
The prohibition against corporate practice exists in the legal profession
as well as the medical profession. Rules against corporate legal practice
are now being reviewed because courts and legislatures recognize the de-
mand for legal services in criminal actions, and now civil actions also.2"
23. Cf. cases cited note 19 supra.
24. 2 Op. ATT'Y GEN. No. 48-32 (Gal. 1948).
25. 1954 Op. AT'y GEN. No. 2699-54 (Colo.). The opinion stated that the profit
motive only affects the likelihood of the exercise of control rather than the power to
exercise control. The power alone rather than the probability of its exercise governed
this ruling; cf. 1956 Op. ATT'y GEN. No. 056-322 (Fla.) (distinguishing between a
non-profit hospital (where an employment relation was disallowed) and a publicly
financed hospital (where it was allowed)).
26. 1954 Op. ATT'y GEN. (Idaho May 26).
27. 1955 Op. ATT'Y GEN. (Idaho July 11).
28. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377
U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See also Cheatham, Availa-
bility of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual Lawyer and of the Or-
ganized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 438 (1965).
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In analyzing cases involving unauthorized practice of law, the courts look
not to mere forms but to practical realities. While any case may involve
particular possibilities of abuse of clients, courts often find such possibil-
ities outweighed by the overriding necessity of assuring adequate, low-cost
legal services." It has been held that a non-profit legal assistance cor-
poration may use a group of laymen to advise it on broad questions of
policy, but the corporation must be controlled and supervised by attorneys
who are directly responsible to the courts for the maintenance of profes-
sional standards.30
Although personal health services have never been held to be an enforce-
able right, Congress and state legislatures have recognized the importance
of some services by publicly subsidizing them. 1 This recognition should
be sufficient reason for the courts and attorneys general to treat corporate
medical practice as they treat corporate legal practice. 2 The courts should
balance protection of the public from abuses, such as lay control over
professional acts and judgments, against the necessity of high quality,
low-cost, comprehensive, and accessible personal health services.
C. Recognition in Tort Law of the Institutionalization of Health Services
In the preceding article, Professor Arthur Leff analyzed numerous mal-
practice cases affecting the delegation of tasks to health personnel. Three
of these cases require attention here because they reflect, in the tort area,
a growing recognition of trends in health care, such as increasing insti-
tutionalization, that have been ignored by courts when faced with cor-
porate practice questions.
In Bing v. Thunig,33 the New York Court of Appeals noted changes in
the health-service role of hospitals:
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the pa-
tient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but
29. See generally Comment, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1361 (1966).
30. Application of Community Action for Legal Services, Inc. 26 App. Div. 2d 354,
274 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1966). Comment, supra note 29, at 1362-63.
Society can guarantee equal justice only by providing all citizens with effective ac-
cess to the institutions by which justice is obtained and by making a lawyer's services
accessible to all, even his assistance in changing laws. Note, Neighborhood Law Offices:
The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 IHAv. L. REv. 805 (1967).
31. The trend in federal health legislation since the enactment of the Social Security
Act of 1935 establishes a national policy of extending comprehensive health services
to all of the American people. See Bok, Emerging Issues in Social Legislation: Social
Security, 80 HARv. L. Rzv. 717 (1967).
32. Cf. Application of Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., 26 App. Div.
2d 354, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1966).
33. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss3/5
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their own
responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. . . . [T]he person who
avails himself of "hospital facilities" expects that the hospital will at-
tempt to cure him. ... "
By this language the court demonstrated its singular awareness of the chang-
ing attitude towards health care services.
In Manlove v. Wilmington General Hospital,"' a Delaware Superior
Court held that a private hospital that received funds and publicly solicited
tax free subscriptions was equivalent to a public service agency and there-
fore required to render emergency services. That characterization was
rejected by the Delaware Supreme Court, but it concluded that if a private
hospital maintains an emergency room and holds itself out to the public
as providing emergency service, it is required to render services when it
reasonably determines that an emergency exists. 6 The important point
is that it is the hospital, not the doctors who work in it, which is responsi-
ble for making the emergency service available.
In Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,"7 the plain-
tiff was taken to the defendant hospital's emergency room to be treated
for a broken leg. The hospital was accredited by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals. As a result of the attending physician's
negligence, gangrene developed, requiring below-the-knee amputation.
After settling his claim against the physician, the plaintiff sued the
hospital alleging that its administrators had not exercised proper care in
attending to his condition. The hospital contended that it had no duty
to supervise the care given by the attending physician, and no duty to
require the use of consultant physicians. In deciding for the plaintiff,
the court stated that the duty of a hospital to a patient is not fulfilled
merely by utilizing the means at hand in the community if they are not
appropriate to the risk and if proper resources are readily available else-
where. The court disallowed the hospital's contention that the corporate
practice rule precluded tort liability based on the acts of one of its staff
members. The court emphasized that the hospital must use reasonable care
to retain only qualified physicians on its staff. An additional basis for
the court's holding was the hospital's failure to comply with its by-laws
and with standards of the Joint Commission an Accreditation, both of
which required consultation in difficult cases.
34. Id. at 666, 143 N.E.2d at 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
35. 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18 (1961).
36. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961).
37. 33 II1. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966),
aff'g 50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964).
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If the Manlove case makes the hospital responsible to provide care, the
Darling decision indicates the possibility of the hospital's responsibility
for its quality. All three cases indicate that increasing institutionalization
of health services will receive judicial recognition and will be reflected
in tort liability. This recognition, coupled with increased public interest in
health services, will require a re-examination of those precedents in tort
liability which conflict with current standards and practices in health-
service performance.3 8
D. Summary and Suggested Improvements
When courts and attorneys general consider the corporate practice
rule, they must recognize the present realities of providing personal health
care. Legislation prohibiting corporations from practicing medicine is
unnecessary; a corporation cannot diagnose and treat disease." When
a corporation contracts with persons to supply them with health services,
it is not practicing medicine;" but, when a corporation contracts to pur-
chase the professional services of physicians, its profit orientation may
tempt it to cut costs by reducing the quality or the range of services of-
fered--evils which the corporate practice rule was adopted to prevent.
A possible solution is the non-profit corporation. By their articles of in-
corporation, these non-profit corporations could be required to confine
their corporate activities to the economic aspects of medical or dental care;
prevent lay judgments from interfering with the doctor-patient relation-
ship; and observe ethical restrictions against advertising, solicitation, de-
ception, or exploitation of the public."'
Legislative modification of the practice rule is a better and quicker
method of change than interpretation of existing law by courts and at-
torneys general. Legislatures can formulate comprehensive policies re-
garding corporate health care activities that will promote institutional
medical care while protecting against the evils that general recognition of
corporate medical practice might entail. These statutory guidelines could
be developed to aid courts and medical licensing agencies when they are
38. The Darling decision stated that the health profession and occupations may
not set their own standards and unduly delay the adoption of new and available de-
vices. Id. at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 257 (1965).
39. See 1956 MrNN. ArT'Y GEN. RsP. 80, 88; cases cited notes 12-13 supra. But
see 1966 Op. ATT'Y GEN. No. 6179 (Ore.) (business and professional aspects of services
are inseparable).
40. Some courts have distinguished non-profit group health plans from cases involv-
ing commercialization. See, e.g., Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C.
1938).
41. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss3/5
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
called upon to resolve questions of possible abuse. Many legislatures have
begun to make limited exceptions to the rule against corporate practice.
For example, Ohio law was changed42 so that corporations such as tho
Cleveland Clinic can now charge patients directly for physicians' services."'
What is needed is a comprehensive revision that will permit full considera-
tion of all sociological, economic, technological, and medical issues.
II. ENABLING ACTS FOR PREPAID HEALTH-SERVICE PLANS
Prepaid health services may be provided by commercial insurance com-
panies, by service companies sponsored by non-profit hospitals and phy-
sicians (Blue Cross and Blue Shield), and by non-profit consumer-spon-
sored organizations. Physician-sponsored plans are developed, organized,
and managed by state and local medical associations. Consumer-sponsored
plans are organized and managed by consumer groups, which employ a
closed panel of physicians who are organized to practice as a group and
are compensated by salary rather than fee-for-service. More than seventy-
five per cent of the American people have prepaid health coverage of
some form."4
Consumer-sponsored prepaid service plans faced initial and continuing
legal difficulties because of the corporate practice rule.4" In order to meet
the public's demands for prepaid plans, physician-sponsored plans were
initiated as an alternative. State legislatures had to pass specific enabling
acts to avoid the application of the corporate practice rule to these phy-
sician-sponsored plans. Because some of these acts were broadly drawn,
other prepayment plans have occasionally been able to come within their
scope.
State enabling acts may be restrictive46 or permissive." The restrictive
42. OHIo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 1737.02 (1964).
43. See Cleveland Clinic v. Sombrio, 35 Ohio 2d 112, 215 N.E.2d 740 (1966).
44. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON Hosp. COSTS 47-59 (1965).
45. People ex rel. State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal.
2d 156, 82 P.2d 429, cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1938); Benjamin Franklin Life
Assur. Co. v. Mitchell, 14 Cal. App. 2d 654, 58 P.2d 984 (1936); Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App. 2d 592, 52 P.2d 992 (1935). But see Group Health
Assn. v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D.C.C. 1938), which held that a non-profit mutual
benefit corporation would not be prohibited from operating.
46. H. HANSEN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF GROUP HEALTH PLANS, 2-4 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as HANSEN]; see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-25-1 to 58-25-48 (Supp. 1967).
Some of these provisions might also be mandatory and disallow all plans which fall to
qualify under the restrictive provision. New Mexico is an example.
47. HANSEN, supra note 46, at 2-4; see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57-1 to 57-20
(Supp. 1965).
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acts are those that allow physician-sponsored prepayment plans only. 8
Those that permit consumer-sponsored plans as well are called permissive."
Restrictive acts may be unconstitutional either because they violate due
process or because they delegate public functions to private medical so-
cieties." Perhaps for this reason, some apparently restrictive enabling acts
were construed by the courts to be permissive, thus consumer-sponsored
plans were allowed to operate. 1 Some states with restrictive acts have
passed special enabling provisions to allow consumer-sponsored plans. 2
Comprehensive prepaid coverage should be expanded to reach more of
the population and in ways most appropriate to individual needs. This
may be achieved by liberal construction of restrictive enabling acts or
passage of permissive enabling acts.
III. INSURANCE CODES AND REGULATIONS
Insurance statutes and regulations governing advertising, cash reserves,
and investment management are designed to protect the public against
abuses by commercial fire, casualty, life and health insurers.5 4 They can
also apply to non-profit prepaid health service programs. For example,
the non-profit Blue plans are subject in some jurisdictions to the regulations
over commercial insurers, although in other jurisdictions they have been
exempted explicitly by statute' or judicial interpretation."
48. HANSEN, supra note 46, at 2-3.
49. Id.
50. Group Health Ins. v. Howell, 40 N.J. 436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963).
51. Cf. Complete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soc'y, 43 Cal. 2d
201, 272 P.2d 497 (1954) (construing the general non-profit corporation law of Cali-
fornia as allowing operation of consumer-sponsored plans, even though the specific en-
abling act (CAL. CORP. CODE, § 9201 (Deering 1962) ) was restricted to physician spon-
sored plans).
52. HANSEN, supra note 46, at 3-4; see, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 185.981 (1957).
53. It should be recognized, however, that these statutes and cases in no way effect
institutional practice and the employment of salaried physicians by non-profit hospitals.
Willcox, supra note 11, at 463-64.
54. See generally R. MEHR, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE (1961); R. HENSLEY, COm-
PETITION, REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NON-LIFE INSURANCE (1962).
55. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAw §§ 250-60 (McKinney 1966) (providing for prepaid
health service plans to operate under the supervision of the State Insurance Department) ;
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1738.04 (1964) (requiring consumer-sponsored plans to be
regulated by State Superintendent of Insurance). See generally REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S
Coium. ON Hosp. COSTS (1965), recommending transfer of the regulatory functions
to the Health Department. This was partially accomplished in 1965 through an amend-
ment to § 2807 of the Public Health Laws of New York State providing for the Health
Commissioner to certify to the Superintendent of Insurance that rate schedules for
hospital services are reasonably related to cost.
56. Although state insurance code provisions and federal antitrust laws may interfere
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Some state insurance laws can be construed as defining insurance to
include all enterprises which collect periodic payments as consideration
for cash benefits payable upon the happening of certain contingent events."'
The question raised by such definitions is whether the provision of serv-
ices is legally equivalent to cash, and whether service plans should there-
fore be subject to the insurance laws. Some courts have answered the
question negatively. s8 They have construed such plans to be contracts for
services rather than indemnification against losses and, therefore, have
exempted them from the coverage of the regular insurance statutes and
regulations. They reason that there is no risk that the contract would not
be performed because the physicians are engaged by the plan in advance
and stand ready to render their services. The fallacy in such reasoning is
that physicians stand ready only so long as the service company is solvent;
they make no commitment to work without compensation. Consequently,
these cases tend to rely on form over substance, and ignore the need of
plan members for protection against fiscal instability or insolvency.
On the other hand, insurance regulations must not be applied to non-
profit prepaid health care plans in a manner which hampers expansions
and innovations in their coverage." The key question is how to preserve
sufficient flexibility for prepayment plans and still provide public protec-
tion. " Because non-profit plans do not have the profit motivation of the
commercial insurers, they should not be identically regulated. 1 In regu-
lating the non-profit plans, states must gear the protection to the specific
with cooperative risk-sharing among the commercial companies and although certain
state laws may interfere with some pooling of risks under the "Blue" plans, these ques-
tions are germane to the present study since they do not directly affect medical care
organization or health manpower utilization.
57. HANSEN, supra note 46, at 5.
58. See Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (indicating
a substantial difference between contracting to render services even on a contingent
basis and contracting merely to stand their cost when or after rendition); California
Physicians' Serv. v. Garrison, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 172 P.2d 4 (1946).
59. NATL Comm'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 201-02.
60. In the case of non-profit service plans sponsored by physicians or consumers,
there would seem to be less inducement to defraud the public or carry out financially
dubious operations. "Non-profit," however, means very little because actual profits
may be disbursed as salaries to plan operators or participating professionals. Regulation
of prepaid health care plans is therefore essential to protect the public against the
dishonest, financially weak, incompetently managed, or fly-by-night operations. Con-
versation with office of the Insurance Commissioner of California.
61. Conversation with Mr. Scott Fleming, General Counsel of the Kaiser Founda-
tion. Prepaid comprehensive coverage plans have evolved very slowly in spite of mini-
mal regulation, perhaps because there are serious administrative difficulties in establish-
ing them.
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problems presented: financial weakness, managerial incompetence, and
poorly planned sales efforts which deplete their cash reserves.2
The proper degree of regulation can be accomplished by mandatory
licensing of prepaid health care plans, and by exempting their operations
from coverage by existing insurance laws." Licensure laws can require
contingency reserves protected by reinsurance or other underwriting,
qualifications for agents, and regulatory surveillance against mis-
representation, lay interference with professional acts, commercialization,
and exploitation.6" Such legislation would provide appropriate public pro-
tection and still allow more flexibility for experimentation and expansion
of the plans than do the stringent state insurance codes. A specific licen-
sure program seems preferable to the present alternatives of either no pro-
tection of the public or restraining protection by insurance regulations. 5
A licensure statute administered by a regulatory agency can also require
or encourage prepayment plans to provide for: 1. maximum public cov-
erage; 2. protection that continues when a member is unemployed; 3. equi-
table contribution by employers and employee members; 4. public sub-
scriber and professional representation on the governing boards; 5. cov-
erage of preventive, curative, and rehabilitative services; 6. coverage of
ambulatory, hospital, extended care, or home care services; 7. increased
risk-spreading; and 8. protection against arbitrary cancellation.66
Whether or not the licensure form is used, regulation of prepaid health
plans should be administered by that agency having primary responsi-
bility for promoting health services, such as the agency designated for
health planning pursuant to the Partnership for Health Amendments of
1967.7 This arrangement would facilitate effective coordination of de-
62. Conversation with office of the Insurance Commissioner of California.
63. See Assembly Bill No. 2089, California Legislature, Reg. (Gen.) Sess. (1963),
which would have required licensure of prepaid health care plans and would have
established licensing a Health Care Plan Board as part of the State Department of
Public Health, consisting of three members of the public appointed by the governor. For
the Knox-Mills Act, passed in lieu of this bill, see CAL. GOV'T CODE, §§ 12530-12539
(Deering Supp. 1966).
64. Conversation with office of the Insurance Commissioner of California.
65. A few states have special statutes requiring health service plans to maintain
contingency funds to cover epidemics. E.g., MIss. CODE. ANN. §§ 5615-01, -04 (1942)
(corporation must establish epidemic reserve of $5,000 before beginning business and
thereafter set aside 2Y2% of receipts until reserve equals $75,000 or 55% of net an-
nual income, whichever is higher); ORE. REV. STAT. § 742.010 (1963) ($25,000
paid-up capital or $50,000 guaranty required).
66. Conversation with Mr. Scott Fleming, General Counsel of the Kaiser Founda-
tion Medical Plan. See also NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 201, 202, 71, 74.
67. See REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S CoMm. ON Hosp. COSTS 47, 52, 53-59 (1965);
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss3/5
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veloping prepayment programs with state-wide efforts to plan for com-
prehensive personal health services.
IV. PREVENTING HARASSMENT OF PREPAYMENT PLANS
The development and continued operation of institutionalized health
services and prepaid health care plans require that their activities be free
from harassment from public and private sources.
In the early stages of the evolution of consumer-sponsored prepaid health
care plans, local medical societies adopted an openly hostile attitude to
their operations.6" Much of this hostility, during and immediately follow-
ing the Depression, was based on the contention that low salaries paid
to participating physicians could lead to their exploitation and cause them
to practice poor medicine. Supporters of such plans argued that by not
paying physicians on a fee-for-service basis they were able to give low-
cost, comprehensive services. This argument has little relevance today be-
cause the method of payment (fee-for-service vs. salary) no longer de-
termines the ability to deliver low-cost, comprehensive coverage. A more
important factor today is the reduced use of in-patient facilities and the
concomitant increase in the use of out-patient care.
The major challenge to this hostility was presented in 1943 in United
States v. American Medical Association.69 In this case, hospital privileges
and medical society membership had been denied physicians who coop-
erated in a consumer-sponsored plan. The United States Supreme Court
held that harassing participating physicians constituted a violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Application of the Sherman Act to such inter-
ferences was based on findings of economic damage to the group and its
physician members, and on a holding that, legally, medical practice is
a trade.7"
State restraint-of-trade laws have been similarly applied. For example,
in Group Health Cooperative v. King County Medical Society,7 the Su-
preme Court of Washington enjoined the medical society from excluding
physician members of the Group Health Cooperative from hospital staff
membership. The court held that the practice of medicine was a trade
within the scope of common-law and statutory prohibitions against un-
H.R. 6418, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (Partnership for Health Amendments of 1967-
which provide for a three-year expanded partnership for health program).
68. See Hansen, Group Health Plans-A Twenty Year Legal Review, 42 MINN. L.
Rv. 527, 535 (1958).
69. 317 U.S. 519 (1943), aff'g 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
70. Id.; cf. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952)
(appeal dismissed as moot and for lack of evidence).
71. 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
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reasonable restraints of trade. Further, a report of the Commission on
Medical Care Plans of the American Medical Association noted that med-
ical societies and other associations were subject to state and federal anti-
trust laws if their activities adversely interfered with a consumer-sponsored
prepaid medical care plan.72
The actively hostile attitude of state and local medical associations to-
wards consumer-sponsored prepaid plans is now of only historical signifi-
cance. 3 The only remaining questions are whether the public interest
in the development of prepaid medical care can be adequately protected by
state or federal anti-trust laws, specific legislation prohibiting denial of
hospital privileges to licensed physicians because of participation in con-
sumer-sponsored plans,74 or more far-reaching regulations. Both anti-trust
statutes and medical anti-discrimination statutes place burdens of litiga-
tion and proof on those accused of unethical practice. It seems preferable,
therefore, that such restraints on physicians be treated as interferences with
activities essential to the public interest, with public agencies guarding
against harassment. Regulation of attempted interference or discrimination
would be an appropriate role for the proposed state agency for licensing
and regulating prepaid plans.7" In the meantime, regulations should be
developed and enforced by a public agency such as state licensing boards
or health departments.
CONCLUSION
Legal standards affecting the organization of health services can inhibit
expansion of and innovations in consumer-sponsored prepaid medical care
plans which employ a closed panel of physicians practicing as a group.
Similarly, they can interfere with institutionally delivered services in which
non-profit hospitals employ physicians on a salaried basis. These basic
standards evolved at a time when problems of lay interference with pro-
fessional acts and commercialization were real rather than theoretical and
posed threats to delivery of high-quality, ethical medical care. It now ap-
pears that these standards are more matters of form than substance and
require re-examination in light of the realities of stated needs for expanded
delivery of low-cost, comprehensive personal health care.
72. See A.M.A. Commission on Medical Care Plans, J.A.M.A. (Special Edition),
Jan. 17, 1959, at 50-52. See also NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, 71-74, 201-02;
HANSEN, supra note 46.
73. A.M.A. Commission on Medical Care Plans, supra note 72, at 47-53, 92-93.
74. E.g., N.Y. PUBLIc HEALTH LAW § 206-a (McKinney Supp. 1967). This statute
deals only with direct harassment causing loss of staff privileges. Although it forbids
discrimination by any tax-exempt hospital against any licensed physician, the burdens of
litigation and proof are placed on the physician to establish that his rejection was the
result of discrimination. See HANSEN, supra note 46, at 9.
75. Text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
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